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The European Community (EC) is a major grain  Eliminating MCAs and continuing stabilizers
producer, accounting for about 12 percent of world  (scenario 1) would slightly increase grain production
production in 1989-90. EC grain exports (mainly  above baseline as member countries'  exchange rate
lower-quality feed wheat) increased significantly over  policies adjust. Total EC1O  grain production will
the last three decades, and grain imports (mainly  increase 2 percent a year over baseline in 1995-2000,
higher-quality bread wheat) declined. In 1973, the EC  but eliminating the CAP and returning to a pre-CAP
shifted from being a net importer to being a net  growth path for yields (scenario 2) would produce a
exporter.  Developing countries, on the whole, are  decline in grain production  -with  total ECIO wheat
heavy grain importers.  production 27 percent below baseline in 2000.
The EC's  Project 1992 will abolish intemal trade  Under scenario 1, eliminating MCAs causes a
barriers to facilitate the movement-of goods, persons,  slight decline in world wheat and coarse grain prices.
services, and capital between member coun,ries.  One  By 2000, real wheat prices fall I percent and com
aspect of the program is elimination of border taxes  prices 0.62 percent below baseline.  Under scenario 2,
and subsidies (called MCAs) on agricultural com-  prices rise substantially.  Wheat prices increase (by
modities.  Coupled with intemal pressures to red ice  o.49 percent) morc  'ihn coarse grain prices (2.18
agricultural budget expenditur  , the EC-1992  percent) because retuming to historical yields would
program has affected agricultural policy by weaken-  reduce wheat production and exports substantially
ing the role of the price intervention system. An  more than coarse grains.
example was the 1988 adoption of a common  Under scenario I, developing countries'  net
agricultural policy (CAP) reform package called  import costs for grains fall slightly and imports rise,
"stabilizers" to limit market price supports.  in response to lower prices.  By 2000, the cost of
Using an econometric model, Ingco and Mitchell  grain imports for all developing countries falls
show the stabilizers and the elimination of the MCAs  US$153 (constant 1985 dollars); Asian and Middle
to have a limited effect on world grain prices and  Eastefn developing countries save the most.  Under
trade. The stabilizers depress the ECU intervention  scenario 2 the returr  to historical yields increases
price, but their effect on production is minimal as cuts  developing countries'  cost for grain imports by an
in nominal ECU intervention prices are partly offset  estimated US$906 million (contstant 1985 dollars).
by adjustments in green exchange rates when MCAs  Exchange rate variations in member countries
are eliminated.  In general, the new arrangements to  have also affected the level of protection of EC
remove MCAs involve revaluing the green rates in  agriculture.  Under current macroeconomic policies,
countries with positive MCAs and devaluing them in  large price cuts would be necessary to bring produc-
countries with negative MCAs. The effect would be a  tion in line with demand. Such price cuts are not
gradual increase in grain prices in France, Greece,  politically feasible, so policies designed to remove
Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom - more so  land and farmers from grain production are likely to
than in countries with strong currencies, such as  be more important.  But land set-aside schemes will
Germany and the Netherlands.  not significantly affect production without much
Baseline projections indicate that total ECIO  higher compensation payments than are now contem-
grain production  will continue increasing as average  plated.
yields increase 2 percent to 2.5 percent a year.
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Production  by CountryI.  Introduction
1.1  The  high  levels of  protection  provided by  the  European Community's  (ECV 1 Common
Agricultural Pelicy  (CAP)  has  transformed  tihe  structure of EC  agriculture.  The level and  form of support
has  encouraged  excess  production  and  large  exportable  surpluses. The position of the EC  in the world
grains markets has shifted from being the world's largest net importing region to that of a major net
exporter since the mid-1  970s.2
1.2  In recent years, the economic  and political environment  for agricultural  policy making  in the EC
has changed  and a somewhat restrictive price support policy as well as penalties  on overproduction
have been adopted. 3 Several  factors are influencing these changes, but the major driving force for
CAP reform is the internal pressure  to reduce  agricultural  budget  expenditures  (Hecrichsmeyer,  1990).
In addition, the EC's  program  for economic  integration  by 1992 (so  called EC-1  992) has  also  influenced
agricultural policy.
4 While a significant reform of the CAP is not likely in the near term, internal and
international pressures  will require  the EC  to continue to make adjustments  in both the method and
level of  protection to  producers.  These policy changes are regarded as important in easing the
transition to a barrier-free  market  by the end of 1992. The completion  of a barrier-free  market  by 1992
was stipulated in the Single European  Act, which amended  the Treaty  of Rome  and was ratified by all
members  in 1987. Article 8A of the act states that:
The Community shall adopt measures  with the aim of progressively
establishing  the internal market over a period expiring on 31
December  1992...  .The internal market shall comprise  an area without
internal frontiers in which the free movement  of goods, persons,
services, and capital is ensured in accordance  with the provisions
of the Treaty.
This paper considers  only the EC 10 countries and excludes  Spain and Portugal  since they are
not yet fully integrated in the CAP. The European  Community  was formed by the Treaty of Rome  on
Mav.  S  ?5,  1957.  It  began with  six  members, namely, Belgium, France, Italy,  Luxembourg,
Netd  -. nds, and West Germany. In 1973, the EC  expanded  to nine countries,  with Denmark,  Ireland,
and  u  United Kingdom as members.  In 1981, Greece  joined while Spain and Portugal became
members  in 1986.
2  The EC10  shifted from net imports of about 21 million tons of grains in 1960/61 to net exports
of 23 million tons of grains annually during 1  986-89.
3  Recent  reforms in the CAP  are discussed  in Jostling, T., "Europe 1992: CAP  Reform and World
Agricultural Trade" and in Henrichsmeyer,  W.,  CAP  Reform and 1992: A German  Perspective"  both
in EC  1992 Persvectives  On Agriculture, Gardiner  and Kelch, editors, U.S. Department  of Agriculture
Staff Report No. AGES  9043.
4  The political pressure to keep the 1992 agenda on track was a major factor leading to the
adoption  of the February  1988 CAP  reform package,  called "stabilizers." These  stabilizers  seek  to limit
price supports to producers  and the cost of agricultural  programs  automatically,  reducing  agricultural
price supports  in response  to excess  production. For  a discussion  of events  shaping  the 1  992 Internal
Market Program,  see Jostling, 1990; Henrichsmeyer,  1990, and Leon Y. and L. Mahe, 1990.2
1.Z,  While there is doubt that the EC  can achieve  this goal by the end of 1992, the internal market
program is being used effectively as rationale and vehicle for reform in  many sectors, incluing
agriculture. An aspect  of the program  which has significance  for agriculture  is the elimination  of border
taxes and subsidies (MCAs) on commodities which result from operations  of the EC agrimonetary
policy.  Since abolishing  the MCAs requires  reforms  in the EC  agrimonetary  policy, particularly in the
system of  green rates, this  will  have implications on domestic prices faced by  producers and
consumers. In addition, the EC-1  992 program  has affected agricultural policy by weakening the role
of the intervention system through reductions  in the guaranteed  prices  fo. producers.
1.4  The reduction of guaranteed  prices or eliminition of agricultural subsidies in the EC would
cause significant changes  to the structure of EC  agriculture, and would have important implications
for world agricultural  markets. Since  the developing  countries  are major  grain importers, such  changes
would also have important implications  for them.  Reductions  in EC  price supports would lead  to large
changes  in the level and mix of EC  agricultural production  and trade.  Returns  to land, labor, capita;,
and other inputs would change.  Reductions in support prices would  also likely reduce fertilizer
application rates, and thus yields.  Agricultural production more closely reflecting the comparative
advantage  of each member  country would emerge. The objective of setting uniform farm pric6Q,  is
complicated  by the existence  of different and  non-harmonized  economic  environments  among  countries
with varying inflation and growth rates.
1.5  This paper  seeks to measure  the domestic and world market impacts of policy reforms in the
EC.  The effects  on EC prices, production and trade of dismantling agricultural border taxes and
subsidies (Monetary Compensatory  Amounts (MCAs), including all MCAs created by exchange  rate
realignments)  are determined. In addition, alternativa  scenarios  for the reduction  of support prices  are
simulated and the effects on world grain prices and trade for developing  countries are estimated.
1.6  Section 2 provides a brief review of trends in EC  grain production  and trade, and developing
countries  trade. A brief summary  of recent reforms  to the CAP  and  policy changes  in agriculture  under
EC-1  992 are discussed  in section 3.  Section  4 presants  the analytical model. Projections  of EC  grain
production, consumption, and trade under various policy scenarios  are discussed in section 5. The
effects on world grain  production, prices,  trade and  net import costs for developing  countries  are also
presented in section 5.3
II. Trends in Grains  Trade: EC  and the Develogina  Countries
EC  Grains  Trade
2.1  The EC  is a major grain producer,  accounting  for about 12% of world production it, 1989/90.
During the last three decades,  EC  agricultural production has grown more rapidly than domestic food
consumption  and, since 1973 EC  agricultural  exports have increased  more rapidly  than imports since
1973. This catused  the EC  to shift from a net importer  to a net exporter  for several  major  commodities.
However, a signlificant  increase  in the EC's imports of animal feedstuffs kept the EC  as the world's
largest importer of food and agricultural products.
2.2  Total grain exports increased  significantly over the last three decades, while grain imports
reversed  their up trend (Figure  1).  The EC's share  of world grain trade exhibited similar trends, with
the share  of total imports declining  rapidly since  the mid-1  970s and  that of exports steadily increasing
(Figure  2).
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2.3  The grow h of net wheat exports was particularly rapid (Figure 3), and the share of world
wheat net exports increased  from 6% to 17% between the mid-1970s and 1987/88 (Figure  4).  In
1990/91, the region  was the world's third largest exporter  and  producer  of wheat, accounting  for 22%
of world exports and about 14.5% of production. The EC  is also a major importer of wheat.  The EC
typica,ly produces  lower quality feed wheat and imports higher  quality bread  wheat for blending. Prior
to 1971, imports gonerally  exceeded  exports.  Since  then the reverse  has been  true, and since 1977
exports exceeded  imports by an increasing  margin.4
2.4  Wheat is produced in all EC  countries.  Four  countries, namely, France,  West Germany,  Italy,
and the United Kingdom  produce  over 75% of the wheat.  France  is the largest wheat producer  in the
EC,  with about 35-40% of output in recent years. Area planted to wheat in France  is about 35% of
EC  total wheat area and  average  yields  generally  exceed  those of otner members  by a production  share
of about 5 points.
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2.5  Increased  EC  self-sufficiency is also  occurring  for coarse  grains. Between  the early 1960s and
mid-1  970s, the EC's coarse grain net imports were quite stable averaging  about 1  5 million tons per
year.  Following an increase in net imports in  1976/77 due to  drought, net coarse grain imports
declined with the EC  a net exporter since 1984/85 (Figure  5).  The EC's share of world coarse grain
imports also declined significantly over the last three decades  (Figure  6).5
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Developing  Countries'  Grain  Trade
2.6  The  developing  countries  are  large  grain  net importers.  Certain  countries  such  as  Thailand  (rice
exporter)  and Argentina  (wheat and coarse  grains  exporter)  are large  exporters,  but overall  the
developing  countries  are importers. Table 1 shows that Asia and the Middle  East-North  Africa
dominate,  but all regions  have  increased  imports. Since  the mid-1970s,  an increasing  gap  between
grain  production  and consumption  in developing  countries  has  occurred. The developing  countries
imported  42.7% of the  world's  grain  trade  in 1988  compared  to 18.5%  in 1970. This  increase  reflects
changes  in both the mix and levels  of per capita  food consumption  in many  countries. Wheat  for
human  consumption  and livestock  feeding  of maize  and wheat have both increased  sharply. the
increase  in wheat consumption  reflects  in part, the increasing  urbanization  in many  countries,  which
is related  to higher  incomes  in urban  areas  and  to the increasing  demand  for diversity  and  convenience
in the diet. As incomes  increase,  the percentage  of wheat  and meat  products  in food  consumption
tends  to increase,  while  human  consumption  of coarse  grains  declines.  The  increased  demand  for meat
at higher  income  levels  results  in an  increase  in  the derived  demand  for coarse  grains  and  feed  wheat.
These  trcnda  are  most apparent  in rapidly  growing  developing  countries.6
Table I
Net Grain Imports of Developing Countries
-------------------------------------------------------- __------------
Region  1960  1970  1980  1988
(Million Tons)
-------------------------------------------------------------- __------
Asia  9.2  13.2  27.9  33.6
Africa  0.5  1.9  7.3  6.2
Latin America  0.3  -4.8  3.9  12.3
Middle East  5.0  10.0  25.9  36.1
All Developing
Countries  15.0  20.3  65.0  88.2
Share of
World Market (%)  21.5  18.5  30.2  42.7
Source:--Data--from-USD---computations-  by-------------World------ank.-
Source:  Data  from  USDA,  computations  by  IECIT,  World  Bank.7
Ill. EC  Grains Policv  Develooments  and FJiure Directions 6
3.1  The most important CAP policy reform in the 1980s was ths  European  Commission's action
to  reduce intervention in the grains sector 6. During most of the  1 980s, the EC faced budgetary
problems. As a result, reforms  toward a mort, r6strictive price policy li.e.,  guaranteed  prices  stubject
to a maximum quantity) were adopted.  In 1988/89  the "stabilizers" were implemented along with
changes in  the  coresponsibility leVy 7. The stabilizer mechanism involves the  imposition of  an
additional  coresponsibility  lsvy of 3% of the nominal  intervontion  price, if grain prodLztion  ',xceeds the
Maximum Guaranteed  Quantity (MGQ). The MGQ  is fixed at 160 million  tons for four years (1  988/89
to 1391/92). If the MGQ is exceeded,  the nominal  target price for the following year is also reduced
bv 3%.
b  Material  in  this  section  was  developed  from  several  sources  including  various  issues  of  the  CAP  Monitor,  The  Agricultural
Situation  in  the  Communizy  by  tl'e  Commission  of  the  European  Communities.  For  a discussion  of  the  EC Agricultural  Policies,
see  Harris,  S.,  Swinbank,  A.,  and  Wilkinson,  G.  1983.
a  The  CAP,  eneated  in  1962.  is the  overriding  policy  affecting  agriculture  in  the  EC.  Its  specific  go0ls  were  to  encourage
increased  production,  stabilize  markets,  ensure  a fair  standard  of  living  to  the  farm  sector,  and  encourage  security  of  supply.
Theise objectives  have  led  to  a costly  and complex  system  of  mechanism  to  regulate  the  market  (see  Figure  7 below).  The  most
.mportant  policy  instrument  affecting  producer  prices  is domestic  guaranteed  price  called  an  intervention  price  which  sets  the
minimum  price  within  the  EC.  Import  and  export  mechanisms  are used  to  maintain  the  guaranteed  I  ,s  as  follows:  1)  Importers
are  charge  a variable  levy  which  raises  the  lower  world  price  to  a higher  threshold  price  for  imports.  2)  Obligatory  purcha3es
of  commodities  at  the  intervention  price.  3)  EC exporters  are  givon  variable  export  subsidy  payments  or  refunds  equivalent  to
the difference  betwee'-  the  internal  EC market  price  and  the  world  price.  This  allows  the  EC to  sell  commodities  at  world  prices.
FIGURE  7.  EC PRICE  SUPPORT  MECHANISM  FOR GRAINS
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A  coresponsibility  levy  is  a tax  leviAd  on  producers  which,  in  the  presence  of  a fixed  price  support,  results  in  a tax  burden
borne  entirely  by  farmers.  The  producer  supply  price  declines  by  the  amount  of  the  tax,  while  consumer  prices  remain  fixed.
The  coresponsibility  levy  was  first  introduced  as  part  of  the  1986/87  price  package.  The  size  of  the  levy  is fixed  annually  by
the  Council  of Ministers  (set  at 5.38  ECU/ton  or  3%  of the  July  intervention  price),  paid  by  the  first  buyers  of  grain  and deducted
from  the  price  paid  to  the  producer.3.2  Before 1987/88,  the  intervention price was the  "delivered-to-store price" at  which grain
purchases  were r.iade, adjusted  for quality.  Since  then, a "buying-in" price, which is set at 94%X  of
the basic intervention price has been  paid for grain purchases.
3.3  Other policy developments  include the provision of incentives, through direct payments, to
encourage  the retirement of cropland  (set-aside),  the extensification and diversification  of production,
and early retirement of farmers. About 80% of total assistance  is in terms of market price support.
However, the EC has increased  direct income payment programs in recent Vears.  Other measures
introduced to weaken the role of intervention in  supporting market prices include tighter  quality
standards  on grain eligible for intervention, the introduction of a 94% buying-in price, and a shorter
period over which grains can be sold to intervention agencies.
EC-1992 and MCA Elimination
3.4  Within agriculture,  the launching of the 1  992 program  focused on the agrimonetary  policy of
the CAP  which sets-up a complicated  system of taxes and subsidies  along  the borders  of the member
countries as well as between the EC and the  rest-of-the world.  By influencing agricultural price
relationships  among  countries, the system influences  EC's  extra- and intra-trade. Elimination  of these
border taxes and subsidies represent a fundamental reform for the EC's agrimonotary and trading
systems which in turn would influence EC's  agricultural production  and trade.  Given the complexity
of the  agrimonetary system and its  implementation,  this  section only briefly explains its general
framework and how it affects EC  agricultural prices. The reader  is advised  to see other sources  such
as the CAP Monitor (Agra Europe),  and Toepfer (1986) for a detailed description.  Mackel (1988)
provides  a good analysis  of the effects of the agrimonetary  system on EC  agriculture.
3.5  Although  a common policy  price (denominated in  conversion facto.  called an  ECU) is
established  under the CAP,  the EC  has no common  currency. When the CAP  was formed, the world
monetary system was  based on the  system of fixed  exchange rates created at  Bretton Woods.
Participating  governments,  through  their memberships  in the International  Monetary Fu:r,d  (IMF),  agreed
to maintain a fixed value in terms of gold for their currencies.  Although gold was used in valuing the
currencies,  in practice  the US  dollir was used  as the primary currency  in international  trade. In 1962,
the EC  decided to use the "unit  of account" 8 for fixing the guaranteed  prices under the CAP.  By
making the "unit of account" equivalent to one US dollar, th-  EC was able to use the gold-based
parities between member  countries' currencies  and the US  dollar. The unit of account was then-  used
in  defining CAP guaranteed prices; hence, making the guaranteed prices (expressed in  national
currencies) internally consistent between member countries.  The rates at  which the  common
guaranteed  prices (in units of account) were converted into national curren:ies were called "green
conversion  rates" or "green money".
8  The unit of account was  equal to 0.88867088 grams  of fine gold. This also  meant  that, at this
parity, there were 35 ua per troy ounce of gold. Since  the official price of gold then was $US  35 cents
per ounce, the unit of account was also equal to one dollar.9
3.6  The Bretton  Woods  system of fixed exchange  rates  came  under pressure  during  the late 1  960s
as the exchange rates declared  to the IMF increasingly become out-of-line with market conditions.
While the system allowed  for small parity adjustments  to be made  at frequent intervals, in practice  the
adjustments  made  were large  and  they resulted  in major  international  capital flows.  In 1969, changes
in the parity values were forced on the French  and  West Germany's  currencies. In August 1969, the
French franc was devalued and two  months later, the deutschmark was revalued.  These parity
changes marked the  end  of  the  only  period when common guaranteed )rices  for  agricultural
commodities  were equal  throughout the EC. The devaluation  of the franc implied  that the dollar-franc
ratio rose  from $US1  = 4.93707 to $US:  -5.55419.  This had  the effect of raising  the price in French
francs of any traded commodity priced in foreign currency.  For a variety of  reasons,  the  French
government  decided not to raise  the guaranteed  prices for agricultural commodities  and continued to
use the unchanged green conversion rate.  In order to  prevent French exports to  other member
countries  offering a higher  intervention  price, French  exports were subject to an export  tax and imports
to  an equivalent subsidy--both now  known as monetary compensatory amounts (MCAs).  The
revaluation  of the deutschmark posed a similar problem,  but with opposite policy implications.  The
remedy was to impose  an MCA levied on imports and paid as a subsidy  to exporters.
3.7  Since  then, a separate  system of exchange  rates (now known as agrimonetary  system or green
currenic system) has been used in EC  agriculture. The system affects price relationships  and trade
flows between member  countries.  Weak currency countries such as France  tend to maintain green
rates which are stronger than their central rates to avoid food price increases. Hence, the effective
guaranteed  intervention price expressed  in francs is lower than the EC's common intervention price.
Similarly,  strong currency  countries  such  as Germany  maintain  green  rates  which are  weaker  than their
central rates in order to avoid declines  in domestic prices  and  thus support farm income.  The effective
intervention price in Germany  (in deutschmark)  is therefore higher  than the EC's  common intervention
price.
3.8  To avoid artificial trade flows due  to the price differentials,  a system of taxes and levies (MCA
system) is used  on intra- and  extra-EC  trade. Strong  currency  countries  have positive MCAs and  weak
currency countries have negative MCAs.  MCAs are calculated as the product of the  difference
betweer a country's green and  central rates, and the common  intervention price. Germany's  positive
MCA is applied  as a subsidy on German  exports and a tax on German  imports.  Similarly, France's
negative MCA is applied as a tax on exports and a  subsidy on imports.  This system allows France
(Germany)  to trade at the common  price level while maintaining  a lower (higher) domestic price.
3.9  A major feature of the  1970s was the divergence  of  CAP guaranteed prices (in domestic
currencies)  in different countries -- with the United Kingdom  having  the lowest and West Germany  the
highest prices. In autumn 1976 (during  the sterling crisis), prices in West Germany  were 60% higher
than in the UK. This divergence  was due to the differences in green rates and central rates.  Figures
7 to  1  5 show the green rates and central rates in EC  countries.  Changes in green rates became a
major part of the annual  fixing of prices. Often a green rate devaluation  had more impact on national
prices  than did the increase  in guaranteed  prices (for countries with depreciating  currencies,  typically
Italy, the UK, Ireland, and France  during the 1970s). The EC  Commission  argued  for the elimination
of the MCAs and for automatic changes in green rates but these arguments were rejected by the
member  countries. Finally, in March 1979, all member  countries, except the UK, agreed  that any new
MCAs created  after the agreements  inception would be phased  out after two years provided  that this
did not lead to a drop in support prices in national currencies  for a country with positive MCAs.10
3.10  In general,  the MCAs for the seven  members  of the EMS 9 were fixed.  The MCAs for Italy and
other non-participating  EC  members (UK, Greece, Spain,  and Portugal)  are variable  in the sense  that
they are  calculated  each  week. The calculation  of the MCAs became  rather complicated. It was based
on the percentage difference between the country's currency ECU  central rate and its green rate.
Further  deduction - known as franchises - was provided. Revaluation  of a currency involves  a formal
change in the central rate of the currency involved  and every other ECU  currency. Consequently  all
MCAs are modified, i.e. a revaluation  of one  currency within the EMS  will increase  it positive MCA or
reduce its negative MCA - but not by as much as its revaluation  against  the other ECU  currencies. It
will also increase the negative, and reduce or eliminate the positive MCAs of other countries.  In
general, the introduction of the EMS  contributed to more settled monetary conditions within the EC
in the early 1980s.  The range of MCAs (and therefore of prices) between countries was reduced
considerably.
3.11  rhe system of MCAs resiulted  in an average  increase  of common prices  in national  currencies
of about 3% p.a. compared  to prices expressed  in ECUs. The average  increase  in common prices in
national currencies has been lower than  the  increase in  the  CPI, except  in  1981/82,  and the
development of  prices adjusted for  inflation varied considerably among member countries.  A
realignment  of market exchange  rates and green rates since the first  half of the 1980s has reduced
the effects of the MCAs.
9  The EMS members are Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Ireland, Germany, and
Netherlands.11
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3.12  Clearly,  the  existence  of  MCAs  is  not  190
compatible  with the objectives of the 1992 agenda.  140
However, since reductions in  positive MCAs are  120
equivalent to  price cuts  for agricultural products,  1017
their dismantling  is extremely  difficult. Nevertheless,  90
in March 1984, the Council agreed  to eliminate the  10  999  1982  1994  199b  1989  1990
fixed Positive  MCAs applying  to West Germany  and  I-.
the Netherlands by April  1987.  The respective plans  [
provided  three stages. During  the first stage, MCAs  Figure  15
were redefined in order to reduce positive MCAs by
3% and to increase negative MCAs by 3%.  This
was done by defining MCAs in terms of the difference  between each countries green  rate and a green
central rate per ECU. The green central rate or "green ECU" was made  equivalent to about 103% of
the national central rate per ECU. It changes  in accordance  with the EMS  currency  appreciating  most
(de facto the German  mark).  Countries  with negative MCAs were allowed to depreciate  their green
rates to eliminate their negative MCAs.
3.13  The second stage (January 1985), provided  for a reduction of the positive MCAs of West
Germany  by 5% and the Netherlands  by 0.6-0.8% by appreciating the national green rates, thus
lowering national agricultural prices.  German  farmers were compensated  by a 5% reduction in their
VAT payments.  Remaining  German  and Dutch positive MCAs were scheduled  to be dismantled by
April, 1987.  The 1984 arrangements  overcame  one main obstacle to eliminating  the MCA system.
However, they institutionalized  national price increases  to farmers in countries with  negative  MCAs
above ECU  price increases  because  member  countries can only counterbalance  the effect of negative
MCAs by depreciating  their currencies.
10  The workings of the European  Monetary  System  and the arrangements  for MCA dismantling  are
discussed  in Boyd (1988).13
3.14  In 1987, the "switch-over" system for avoiding  the creation of positive MCAs was examined
by the  Commission.  It recommended  a "gradual return to coherence with  the general monetary
system" by 1992.  This recommendation  of the EC  Commission  was reflected in the adoption of a
scheme  for the automatic dismantling of all MCAs created  by new exchange  rate alignments,  i.e., for
natural MCAs caused by devaluat;in.  The devaluation was done in three steps; 30% when the
currency  moves, the rest in equal steps  at the beginning  of the next two seasons. In 1988,  a decision
was taken concerning dismantlement  - this time in four stages - of existing stocks of MCAs.  The
agrimonetary  decisions  for the agricultural  marketing year 1989/90 provide for the total dismantling
of all MCAs of all member  countries participating in the EMS.  As far as other member  states are
concerned,  the application  of reduced  MCAs continues due to currency variations.
3.15  In Germany,  the program  for MCA removal involves the elimination of the current monetary
gaps by a revaluation  of the German  green  mark in three stages  between 1989 and 1992.  In general,
the removal  of MCAs involves  the revaluation  of the green  rates which, in turn, will increase  the values
of the green  currencies  of the countries with weaker  currencies.  Therefore,  the effect will be a gradua!
overall increase  in price levels and a tendency  for the prices in the weaker currency  countries  to move
closer to the DM values. To prevent MCAs from reemerging,  the European  Commission  will likely
continue to reduce the importance of intervention in supporting  grain prices by widening  the neutral
margin between depreciation  of a currency and the application  of MCAs. The effects of this would
be to increase  grain prices in the United Kingdom  and France  compared  with those in countries with
strong currencies.
3.16  An EMS  realignment  leads  to changes  in the strong currency  correcting  factor. The central rate
correcting factor or switchover has been applied  since 1  984/85.  It has  the effect of cutting positive
real monetary gaps at the expense  of increasing  negative ones, thus leading  to a revaluation  of the
ECU  for agricultural purposes. The central rate correcting factor is adjusted  following EMS  alignments
so as to avoid the creation of new fixed positive MCAs.  In 1987, the Council  increased  the factor to
1.37282 in order to reduce  fixed positive MCAs.
3.17  Leading  to changes  in the strong currency correcting  factor, an EMS realignment  triggers the
arrangments  for automatic green rate changes  to dismantle new real monetary gaps. Real  monetary
gaps (RMGs)  are divided into "artificial" RMGs  which are created by increasing  the correcting factor,
and "natural" RMGs,  which are those created  by the devaluation'depreciation  of a central/market  rate
of  a currency within  the  EMS.  For fixed  MCAs the  amount to  be dismantled following  each
realignment  is that created  by the realignment. For  variable  MCAs it is the increase  in RMGs  since  the
previous realignment, including any increase  occasioned by the central rate changes made at the
realignment.
3.18  The dismantling  of MCAs is effected by green rate devaluations  phased  over the three years
following the realignments  as follows:
a. for natural RMGs:
-up to 30% immediately  following the realignment
-the remainder  in two equal stages  at the beginning  of the
following two marketing  years.
b. for artificial RMGs:
-25% at the beginning  of the next marketing  year after the
realignment
-37.5% at the beginning  of the each of the two following
marketing years.14
3.19  These  devaluations  are implemented  by the Commission  automatically  unless  the effect would
be  to increase  the RMG or to turn a negative RMG positive.  In the latter case, the green rate is only
adjusted to the extent necessary  to achieve  parity with the central rate.
3.20  Green rate devaluiations  lead to  increased support prices in the national currencies of the
devaluating members.  In order to reduce the budgetary costs of tying the agricultural ECU  to the
strongest currency (de facto the German  Mark),  the first phase of dismantling of artificial MCAs is to
be neutralized  by a reduction in common prices  set in ECU. In 1988, the Council  of Ministers and the
Commission  decided  that the existing stocks of monetary  gaps  for countr"gs  with fixed MCAs shall be
dismantled  by 1992.  As of January 1, 1989, no MCAs are applied in Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,
Luxembourg and in  Netherlands.  In other  member countries, the  monetary gaps (in  national
currency/ecu) applied in the cereal sector are the following: France  (-2.0), Ireland (-2.0), Greece  (-
15.0), Spain (+ 1.0), Italy (-3.2), United Kingdom (-6.1).
3.21  The Commision's  proposals  for 1989/90 included  the removal  of RMG's  for Germany  and the
Netherlands,  the  dismantling of the RMGs of other countries in two  steps (abolish MCAs at  the
beginning  of 1989/90). In 1990/91, the Commision's proposal  included  the complete  abolishment  of
existing real  monetary  gaps in France,  Ireland, Italy, Portugal,  Netherlands;  dismantlement  of one  third
of the real  monetary gap for United Kingdom  and Spain applicable  at the time of the Council decision
on the 1990/91 price proposals;  for Greece,  a dismantlement  of monetary gaps to an extent which
equates  to its inflation rate less  5 points. The price effects of these changes  are shown in Table  II and
Ill.15
Table 11
Price  Effects  of MCA  Elimination
Country  Previous  :  1989/90  ProposaLs  Effects
Central  Green  Real  Dismantt-  Green  Real  Devalua-  Effects
Rate  Rate  Gap  ing  Rate  Gap  tion  on Prices
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
---- NC/ECU  -----  point  point  NC/ECU  point  ------ Percent---------
Germany  2.3413  2.3736  1.368  1.368  2.3411  0.000  1.387  -1.386
Netherlands  2.6378  2.6609  0.866  0.866  2.6378  0.000  0.873  -0.866
France  7.8518  7.5842  -3.529  -1.529  7.6978  -2.000  -1.477  1.499
Ireland  0.8739  0.8438  -3.565  -1.565  0.8567  -2.000  -1.511  1.534
Greece  192.8940  164.7290 -17.098  -12.546  184.4960  -4.550  -10.714  12.000
ItaLy  1711.8400 1635.0000  -4.700  -1.577 1660.0000  -3.123  -1.506  1.529
U. Kingdom  0.7260  0.6750  -7.629  -2.543  0.6914  -5.086  -2.363  2.420
Source:  Green  Europe,  Commission  of the  European  Coummunities,  1989  issues.
(1) Agricultural  central  rate  (CR)
(2)  Green  rate  (GR)
(3)  Real  Monetary  Gap (RMG)  =  l - CR/GRI*100
(4) Dismantlement  of the  real  gap for  crop  year  1989/90  as  decided  by  the  EC  Council  of  Ministers.
(5)  Adjusted  green  rate  decided  by the  EC Council  of  Ministers.
(6)  Real  gap  after  adjustments  in the  green  rate.
(7)  Devaluation  of green  rates  in  percent.
(8) Percentage  variation  between  1989/90  guaranteed  price  (in  national  currency)  and  the  guaranteed
price  in 1988/89.16
Table III
1990/91 AGRIMONETARY  PROPOSALS
Previous  Proposats  Effects
Country  CentraL  Green  Real  Dismantl-  Green  Real  Devatuat-  Effects  on
Rate  Rate  Gap  ing  Rate  Gap  ion  Prices
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
------ NC/ECU  -----  point  point  NC/ECU  point  --  ----  X --------
Germany  2.34113  2.3736  1.368  0.684  2.35725  0.684  0.694  -0.689
Netherlands  2.63785  2.6609  0.866  0.866  2.63785  0.000  0.873  -0.866
France  7.85183  7.6979  -2.000  -2.000  7.85183  0.000  -1.961  2.000
Ireland  0.87390  0.8567  -2.000  -2.000  0.87390  0.000  -1.961  2.000
Italy  1707.11000  1873.0000  -2.039  -2.039  -1707.00000  0.000  -1.992  2.032
United
Kingdom  0.829001  0.7014  -18.196  -6.066  0.738321 -12.130  -5.132  5.409
Source: Green Europe, Agricultural  Prices  1990/91 Commission  ProposaLs,
Comission of  the  European  Communities, 1990 issues.
(1)  Agricultural  CentraL Rate (CR)
(2)  Green Rate (GR)
(3) ReaL  Monetary Gap (RMG)  I  - CR/GR  1*100
(4) Dismantlement of  the  real  gap as decided by the  Council of  Ministers.
(5) Adjusted Green Rate
(6)  Real Monetary Gap  after  adjustments  in  green rate  and MCA  dismantling
(7)  Devaluation  of  green rate
(8)  Percentage variation  between proposed guaranteed price  for  1990/91 and the  guaranteed price
for  1989/90.17
IV.  Analytical Model
3.22  A deterministic  model of exchange  rates  and MCAs is developed  for the 10 EC  countries. This
is linked to a traditional area and yield model to  estimate the effects of policy variable changes.
Compared  to previous studies (Meilke and Gorter, 1987; Bailey, 1989), this model accounts for
differences in the supply response  in each  member  country. Macroeconomic  policies result in varying
changes  in exchange  rates and thus, different domestic prices in each country.  As discussed  in the
previous  section, the creation of a border  free market  in EC  agriculture  requires  the removal  of customs
duties  and  quantitative  restrictions  (e.g.  MCAs).  The dismantling  of  MCAs uescribed in  the
agrimonetary  proposals  is effected by green rate adjustments  phased over a number of years.  The
production and domestic price effects of green rate adjustments as a result of MCA dismantling are
then estimated.
3.23  Letf,  be  a vector of green  exchange  rates u4d  for commodity i, the aggregate  supply  function
(q) and the domestic price effects of green rate adjustments  and support policies can be derived as
follows:
=  q ( Pi * Pw  z)  (  2)
d
where
u.  ~~are  a vector  of short-run  supply  curves
jeCU  are  the intervention  prices  in ECUs
pdw  are  tedomestic  prices  of inputs
z  are  technology  shift variables
pP  are  =  domestic prices for commodity i
Xg,  ~~are  the green  rates  of exchange  for comnmodityi
3.24  The cnefficient  on the  product of  the intervention price and green rates determines the
response  of producer  prices  to changes  in price  policies  such  as the stabilizers  or to adjustments  in
green  rates  in each  country. This  allows  explicit  estimation  of the price  transmission  coefficients.18
3.25  From equations (1) to (3), the price and supply effects of exchange rate adjustments and
support price (intervention price) reductions can be estimated. Green  rate revaluations  (devaluation)
in countries with positive (negative)  MCAs will result in supply reductions  (increases)  since the supply
curves  are monotically increasing  in pd,,  Production  for each  country is then determined  by the product
of separately  estimated area response  and yield fu,  ictions.  The area and yield functions are:
As  =  f  ( RV,  , RVj,  A  , Z,  (4)
Y  f (  Pi, Pjd FPl_ 1 .,  Z,)  (5)
where
A,  is crop area harvested  for commodity i in year t
RVi,.,  is  crop revenue  per hectare  for commodity i in year t-1
RV;.,  is  crop revenue  per hectare  for commodity  j in year t-1
FPi,.,  is fertilizer price paid by farmers in country i in year t
,t  is a linear trend representing  technology
3.26  The analysis  of area  response  uses  expected  crop revenues  as explanatory  variables  rather  than
prices to account for the  nonstationarity of yields and input costs.  "  With technology and the
demand  for input combinations changing,  yields, input costs, and prices  should be considered  in the
area allocation decision (Sanderson, Quilkey, and Freebairn, 1980).  This is modeled by  defining
expected  crop revenues  per hectare  as gross  expected  returns (per  hectare  expected  price  less  fertilizer
costs).  The linear trend variable,  Zt, is included  to capture factors or variables  which are believed  to
be important, but which cannot be included  due  to data limitations. Examples  include technology  and
structural policies (e.g. investments in input supply, processing  and marketing  facilities, substitution
of capital for labor  in the modernization  process,  farm credit subsidies)  which are  considered  significant
sources  of output growth in the EC  (Bouchet, Orden,  and Norton, 1987).
1"  Area response equations using prices as explanatory variables were also estimated for
comparison.19
3.27  The yield equations show a strong trend, particularly for wheat.  Average wheat yields in
France  increased  from less  than 3 tons/ha. in the early 1960s to over 6 tons/ha. by the late 1980s.
Significant growth in yields also occurred in other member countries.  Changes in  the domestic
producer  price of wheat relative  to the index of inputs costs are significant in determining  the growth
in yields. Aggregate EC1  0 wheat area harvested  has been  relatively  stable,  increasing  from an average
of 11.8 million hectares  in 1967/75 (average)  to 12.9 mill on hectares  in 1988/89.  However, varying
trends occurred in member countries.  Wheat area harvested  declined in Greece (-6.3%), Ireland (-
18.5%), Italy (-23.4%), and Netherlands  (-19.8%) between 1967/75 and 1988/89, and increased  in
Belgium-Luxembourg  (+ 1.7%), Denmark  ( + 178%), France  ( + 21.1  %), and  Germany  ( + 13.4%) during
the same period.  In contrast, total coarse grain area harvested  declined in all countries, except Italy,
during the same period.
3.28  Under the  stabilizer mechanism, the  intervention price and the  coresponsibility levy  are
automatically adjusted if  total EC12 grain production exceeds the Maximum Guaranteed  Quantity
(MGQ)  equal to 160 million tons.  For each percentage  point of excess  production between 1  % and
3%, the levy in the current year  is increased  by 1  %. In addition,  the following year's intervention price
is reduced by 3%.  The domestic and world market effects of the stabilizer  mechanism  is shown in
Figure  16 below.
3.29  Figure  16a represents  the domestic market  with EC  supply (SJc)  and  demand (DJC)  curves. The
effects  on  the  domestic market  of  independent increases in  the  coresponsibility levy  and/or
independent  reductions in the guaranteed  price are analyzed as follows,  given an initial condition
defined by the intervention price set at P 0 and quantity equal to the maximum guaranteed  quantity,
MGQ. Consider  an exogenous  shift in supply due  to yield improvements. This is shown in the figure
as a shift in the supply curve from S.co  to S.c1 In the absence  of the stabilizer  mechanism,  this would
result in an increase  in actual EC  supply to Q 18. However, with the stabilizer  mechanism,  this supply
increase violates the MGQ and triggers an increase in the coresponsibility  levy,  represented  by a
rsduction in the guaranteed  price to P 1 (i.e., the levy is subtracted from the guaranteed  intervention
price).  Consider  first the effects of the increase  in the levy.  This results in a reduction in supply to
Q20 and excess  supply equal  to CE. The effects of the reduction  in the intervention price (apart  from
the change in ths  levy) are a decline in quantity  supplied to  Q2s  and an increase in the quantity
demanded to  Qld.  The combination  of these two  changes results in a greater reduction in excess
supply of grains in the EC  to DE,  compared  with CE  with only the levy increase. Hence,  independent
increases  in the coresponsibility  levy result only in production changes  while independent  reductions
in the guaranteed  price result in both production and consumption  adjustments.
3.30  The effects on the world market  of changes  in EC  grains policy are shown in Figure  16b. The
figure illustrates the world market effects of a reduction in the EC  guaranteed  price and an increase
in the coresponsibility  levy.  Consider  first an independent  increase  in the levy.  This is illustrated as
a reduction  in the price from P 0 to Pl. This results  in lower EC  grains  exports equal to JK. This decline
in exports translates into a leftward shift in world grains supply, shown by the shift to SW.  This
reduction  in world supply raises  world market prices  from P*0 to Pw 1. Similar  changes  occur due to a
reduction in the guaranteed  price, but the magnitudes are somewhat greater.  The reduction in the
guaranteed price results in both increases in EC consumption  and declines  in EC production.  This
results in a larger decline in EC  exports and correspondingly  higher world market prices.  EC  exports
decline from JK to LK and world market price increases  to PW 220
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3.31  To estimate the  world effects  of changes in EC policies, the  1  0 country EC model was
intagrated with the World Bank's World Grains  Model" 2,  The World Grains  Model is a global, partial-
equil;brium,  net-trade  model of the grains  and soybeans  markets. Fifteen of the major grain  producing,
consuming, anJ trading countries are modeled individually (i.e., Australia, Canada, Japan, United
States, Argentina, Brazil,  China, Egypt, India, Indonesia,  Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan,  and  Thailand)  and
the remaining countries are grouped into nine regic is (i.e., EC-10, Eastern Europe, USSR, Other
Industrial Countries, Central Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean,  and North
Africa and Middle East).
3.32  The equations in the World Grains Model are econometrically  estimated using primarily OLS
from annual  data  over the period 1  960-1  988.  The model  is linear in both the variables  and parameters.
The commodities included in the world model are wheat, rice, coarse grains (maize, oats, barley,
sorghum, rye, millet, and mixed grains),  soybeans,  soymeal, and soyoil.  Individual  models have been
estimated for each commodity and country or regions with  cross linkages between commodities.
Production  for each country or region  is determined  as the product of separately  estimated harvested
area and yield equations.  Harvested area in each region or country is determined by a two-stage
process  wherein total area harvested  is determined  first and then allocated among competing crops
on the basis of  ;agged per hectare revenue.  Yields in each region or country are estimated as a
function of the ratio of lagged  crop prices  to current fertilizer prices,  the proportion  of area planted  to
high-yielding  varieties in the case of rice and wheat and a linear trend to represent  technology.
3.33  Per capita imports of each commodity in each region or country are estimated directly for
importing  countries as  a  function  of  population, income,  domestic supply and  prices.  Total
consumption  is obtained  as an  identity. Net exports are est.mated  for exporting  countries  as a function
of the level of each commodity available  for export and world prices.  Consumption  in the exporting
countries is estimated as function of population, income and prices.
3.34  A single world price is assumed  for each commodity, and  the model is solved simultaneously
for this price. The price in each  non-EC  country or region is then defined as  the export price converted
to local currency  and deflated by the consumer  price index of the country.  Regional  exchange  rates
and consumer  price indexes  are constructed as  weighted averages  of the data  for individual countries.
3.35  A price equation  is used  to solve the model for the nominal export price for each commodity.
Specific policy information is included for the United States on variables such as diverted areas  and
support prices.
12  Mitchell, Donald  O., "A World Grains  And Soybeans  Model" in International  Commodity  Markets
Models  and Policy  Analysis, 0. Guvenen  (ed.), Kluwer Academic Publishers,  1987, page 87-1 11.22
V.  EC  Grairl SUDDIV  Response  Estimates
5.1  The estimated coefficients of price transmission for wheat and coarse grains are shown in
Table  IV.  The results  were obtained  from the model  presented  in the previous  section. The estimates
are between 0.76  and 1.0, indicating that price transmission between the CAP support prices and
domestic prices in the EC  are less than perfect.  This is partly due to varying exchange  rate policies,
since reductions in support prices are sometimes  offset by adjustments  in the exchange  rates.
5.2  The short-run area and yield response  estimates are shown in Tables V and VI.  As indicated
earlier, the revenue variable  was used instead of price to account for the nonstationarity of yields.
However,  the estimates  using prices  are also  presented  for comparative  purposes. Area and  yields are
found to be responsive  to crop revenues  and input prices, but the estimated area and yield functions
are inelastic. The results  suggest  a significant role for technology changes  in EC  grain yield increases.
TABLE  IV
PRICE  TRANSMISSION  ELASTICITIES
Country  Common  Coarse
Wheat  Grain
Belgium-Lux  0.92  0.96
Denmark  0.95  0.99
France  0.98  0.95
Gezmany  0.97  0.99
Greece  0.85  0.86
Ireland  0.98  0.83
Italy  0.99  0.90
Netherlands  0.86  0.94
United  Kingdom  0.95  0.76
Source:  IECIT,  The  World  Bank.23
TABLE  V
EC SHORT-RUN  AREA  ELASTICITIES  1/
Country/  With  Respect  to Price/Revenue  of
Commodity  ------ Wheat  ------  ----- Coarse  Grain----
Price  Revenue  Price  Revenue
Belgium-  Wheat  0.2375  0.4993  ns  -0.520
Luxembourg  C.Grains  ns  -0.1576  0.1254  0.040
Denmark  Wheat  0.7889  1.3921  -0.4385  -0.990
C.Grains  ns  -0.2220  0.1130  0.090
France  Wheat  0.1780  ns  -0.5250  na
C.Grains  -0.2920  -0.2770  0.4960  0.570
Germany  Wheat  0.0830  0.1750  -0.1430  -0.275
C.Grains  -0.0200  -0.0300  0.  1200  0.080
Greece  Wheat  0.1290  0.0710  ns  -0.100
C.Grains  ne  ns  ns  0.050
Ireland  Wheat  0.2460  0.8840  -0.4480  -0.708
C.Grains  -0.0400  -0.0450  0.1880  0.188
Italy  Wheat  0.2600  0.1790  ne  -0.208
C.Grains  -0.4160  -0.1100  0.4802  0.171
Netherlands  Wheat  0.0850  0.2240  ns  ns
C.Grains  -0.3670  -0.1040  0.2780  0.100
U.Kingdom  Wheat  0.1540  0.5850  ns  -0.489
C.Grains  -0.1770  0.0840  0.1500  ns
Source:  IECIT,  The  World  Bank.
1/  Elasticities  calculated  at the  sample  means,  1961-1988.
ns means  that  the  variable  is not  statistically  significant  at 5%
or  10%  level.24
TABLE VI
YIELD  ELASTICITIES  1/
Country/Commodity  With  Resoect  to
Wheat  Coarse  Fertilizer  Technology
Price  Grains  Price
Price
Belgium  Wheat  0.317  -0.523  -0.341  0.675
C.Grain  ns  ns  -0.228  0.377
Denmark  Wheat  0.114  ns  -0.074  0.254
C.Grain  -0.588  -0.352  -0.218  0.066
France  Wheat  0.198  -0.110  -0.367  0.106
C.Grain  ns  ns  -0.752  -0.124
Germany  Wheat  ns  ns  -0.253  0.295
C.Grain  -0.848  0.551  -0.054  J.132
Greece  Wheat  0.298  -0.002  -0.239  0.050
C.Grain  -0.145  0.002  ns  0.298
Ireland  Wheat  0.487  -0.527  -0.206  0.388
C.Grain  ns  0.016  -0.318  0.167
Italy  Wheat  0.236  -0.173  ns  0.169
C.Grain  ns  0.374  -0.077  0.238
Netherlands
Wheat  0.673  -0.454  ns  0.518
C.Grain  ne  0.027  ns  0.271
United  Kingdom
Wheat  0.192  ns  -0.026  0.435
C.Grain  -0.812  0.588  ns  0.195
Source:  IECIT,  The  World  Bank.
1/  Elasticities  calculated  at  Sample  Means,  1961-1988.
ns  means  that  the  variable  is  not  statistically  significant  at
5%  or  10&  level.25
5.3  Meilke and de Gorter (1987) estimated an aggregate ECtO supply elasticity for wheat using
an aggregate  area and production response  function.  The price elasticity of wheat area with respect
to wheat price was found to be 0.34, and  the cross-price  elasticity with respect to barley price was -
0.75.  Total EC10  wheat production was found to have a direct price elasticity of 0.40.  Compared
with the elasticity estimates  listed in Table  V, the aggregate  estimate hides  the varying degree  of area
response in  each member country.  This variation in  supply elasticities could be explained by
differences in production and farm structure in each member  country.26
VI.  Proiections  of EC Grain Production  and Trade. and the Imolications
for World Grain Prices  and Developinc  Countries' Grain Trade
6.1  Three simulations  were run to evaluate  the implications  of alternative EC  grains policies on EC
grain production  and consumption,  world prices, and  developing  countries  net grain  trade. The supply
model  for wheat and coarse  grains  for the 10 EC  countries  described  earlier  was simulated  to estimate
the effects on wheat and coarse grains production.  Estimates were made for each of the EC10
countries and  then aggregated  to obtain the EC  total.  Demand  effects were included  for the aggregate
EC10  region by applying assumed  price elasticities to the price changes resulting from the policy
alternatives. The changes  in supply and demand  for the ECI0 were transmitted to the world through
changes  in the net trade of wheat and coarse  grains relative to the base simulation. The world grains
model was then used to  evaluate the  price and trade effects of  the simulations.  This two-step
procedure does not allow prices to be transmitted from the world market to the EC, but this has
typically been a feature of the CAP.
6.2  The Base simulation was taken from a recent World Bank forecast scenario  as described  in
Report 814/90.'3  The Base  simulation  and the two alternative  scenarios  are described  in Table VIl.
Scenario I simulates the effects  of  eliminating the  MCAs by  changes in  the green rates.  This
corresponds  closely with the changes  expected  to occur under the 1992 integration of the European
Community.  The changes specified in the agrimonetary proposals were used as a basis for this
Scenario. The second  simulation  alternative, Scenario  II, went well beyond any policy changes  which
are currently being discussed. This simulation  attempts to capture the effects of returning  wheat and
coarse  grain yields in the EC1  0 to their levels  relative  to the United States  prior to the existence  of the
CAP. This was done Ly computing wheat and coarse  grain yields in each of the EC10  countries  and
comparing them with  the US yields during the 5-year period from  1962-66 before the CAP was
created. The relative  yields in this period were taken  to reflect differences inherent  to the country such
as climate, land conditions, water availability and farm structure. In many cases,  the yields of ECI0
countries increased  dramatically over the period of the CAP relative to the increase  in yields in the
United States, especially  for wheat.  We attribute the more rapid growth of yields in EC10  countries
to the higher than world prices under the CAP.  This effect was removed by reducing  the yields for
wheat and coarse  grains  for each  of the EC1  0 countries  to the relative  yields to the United States. The
adjustment was made over the 1991-2000 period,  so that EC  country yields in 2000 were the same
relative to the projected US yields as during the 1962-66 base period.  For some countries, such as
France,  yields declined significantly while in other countries  such 3s  Greece  and Italy, yields declined
only slightly.  Figure  16 shows the effect of reducing  wheat yields in France  to the yield level, relative
to the US, which existed prior to the CAP.
13 "Price Prospects  for Major Primary  Commodities," Report 814/90,  The World Bank, December
1990.27
TABLE  VIli
EC  1992  POLICY SIMULATIONS
BASE SIMULATION - Stabilizers remain in effect through 2000 which
reduces intervention prices in ECU by 3%
per  year.  Domestic  prices  are
computed using green rates.
SCENARIO  I  - BASE  SIMULATION  +  EC-1992
Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) and
Monetary Gaps are eliminated by automatic
adjustments in green conversion rates
in stages  beginning in 1990 (as  specified
in the 1990/91 Agrimonetary proposal).
The CAP is retained but price reforms are
continued through the stabilizers.
Effects  of  EC-1992  on  agriculture  are
captured by the elimination of MCAs.
SCENARIO  II  - SCENARIO I +
Wheat and coarse grain yields return to
pre-EC CAP historical relationships  to US
This represents the elimination
of the CAP and  return of the EC as a  world
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6.3  The overall  idea of Scenario  11  was to simulate  the elimination  of the CAP  and  the return of the
countries of the EC  to a world market price driven region. It is unrealistic  to expect this to occur for
many reasons  but it adequately  bounds the largest change which could be expected.  Moreover,  the
scenario  raises  an interesting question  as to the permanence  of yield changes.  Would  yields return to
their previous relative  levels to the United States? Several  factors suggest  they would not.  Land  and
irrigation improvements would remain  and contribute to higher yields. Genetic improvements  would
also remain  but they could slowly deteriorate  as new diseases  and pests  evolved. Yield increases  due
to high levels of inptits such 3S fertilizer would decline as lower input use became profitable.  The
relative contrib tion of these several  factors would determine  the adjustments  in yields.
6.4  The two  scenarios relative to the Base run provide estimates of  the effects  of EC policy
changes  on wheat and coarse  grains net trade levels. This assumes  that prodLction and  consumption
changes  in the EC  are fully transmitted to the world market through  changes  in net trade. Price  effects
of these exports are estimated for the world for wheat, coarse grains, and rice and these changes
impact the level of trade of the developing  countries.  Rice was included because  it is in the world
model simulations and because  it  is a strong substitute for wheat in many Asian countries.  The
quantities and revenues  or expenditures  on net grain trade are estimated  from the world grains model
and are presented  for geographic  regions.
6.5  Projections  of total grain production  in the 10 member  country are presented  in the Appendix
Tables. Total EC1  0 wheat and coarse grain production under the three policy scenarios is shown in
Figures  18 and 19. The baseline,  which includes  the stabilizer  price cutting mechanism  up to the year
2000,  indicates that while the stabilizers have a depressing  effect upon the intervention price, the
effect on production is minimal.  Reductions in intervention prices are partly offset by changes in29
exchange  rates between national currencies  and the ECU. In 1990/91, for example,  these changes
resulted in higher  domestic prices in Greece  and the United Kingdom, while domestic prices  declined
only slightly in France, Ireland, and Italy.  EC10 total grain production is projected to continue to
increase  at 1.4% p.a. as average  yields continue to increase  at a rate of about 2% p.a.
EC-1 0  WHEAT  PRODUCTION
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6.6  MCA elimination and the continuation of stabilizers  under Scenario  I are projected to result in
a  slight increase in EC10 grain production relative to  the baseline.  Total EC10 grain production
increases  by 2% p.a. over the baseline  in 1995-2000.  The return to historical yields under Scenario
11  resulted in a significant decline in grain production.  Total EC10 wheat production is projected to
decline by 27% relative  to the baseline  in 2000, and coarse  grain production  is projected  to increase
3.7% relative to the baseline  in 2000.  The large effect on wheat production compared  to the small
effect on coarse grain production results from three factors.  First, wheat yields have grown more
rapidly  than coarse  grain  yields under  the CAP  and, consequently,  removing  this growth under Scenario
11  reduces wheat production substantially.  Secondly,  the United States has actually had more rapid
growth in coarse  grain yields over the period  of the CAP  than the EC. But, the United States  achieved
these gains  in hybrid corn whereas  the EC  primarily  produces  barley--which  has not had  the same  yield
increases. Thus it is difficult to estimate  the portion of the EC's coarse grains yields growth due to
the higher  prices  to producers  because  of the CAP. Finally,  interactions  within the estimated  EC  supply
model  increase the relative profitability and production of coarse grains as wheat yields decline.
Combined, these three effects  cause coarse grain production to  increase slightly,  while wheat
production  declines significantly.
6.7  The changes in world wheat and cor.a  prices (as a proxy for all coarse grains) are shown in
Table IX.  Under Scenario I, the elimination of the MCAs decreases  world wheat and coarse grain
prices because  producer prices  in weak currency  countries increase  as their green rates are devalued
to eliminate  the monetary gaps. By the year 2000, wheat prices  fall 1  % and corn prices fall 0.62%.30
Scenario  II results in substantially  higher prices  for wheat (+ 6.49%) and coarse grains (+ 2.18%) by
the  year 2000.  Wheat prices increase more than coarse grain prices because the  EC's wheat
production  declines  sharply while coarse  grains  production  increases  slightly.  Since  these  changes  are
assumed  to be reflected in EC  grain trade, wheat net exports decline causing world wheat prices to
rise.  The increase in world coarse grain prices is due to adjustments in the world market which
increase  all grain prices.
6.8  The effects of the simulated EC  policy changes  on the developing  countries are measured  by
the changes in world prices.  This is only an approximation  of the true effects because  it does not
consider  export subsidies  by the EC  countries  to se:ected  developing  countries. Depending  on changes
in export subsidies,  the full impact on the developing  countries  would be greater or smaller. Scenario
I results in slightly lower world grain prices and lower total net grain import costs for the developing
countries.  Quantities  of imports would also  increase  in response  to the lower prices. By 2000, the cost
of grain imports by all developing  countries  would decline  by US$ 153 million in constant 1985 dollars.
The greatest savings  would go to Asian and Middle  Eastern  developing  countries because  they are the
largest imporzers. Asian countries  would save an  estimated US$  63 million (in constant 1985 dollars)
and Middle Eastern  countries would save  an estimated US$ 54 million (in constant 1985 dollars).
6.9  If the EC  returned  to historical  yield levels for weat and coarse  grains, as simulated in Scenario
11,  then the world prices  of all grains would rise. This would increase  the cost of grain imports by the
developing  countries by an estimated US$ 906 million in constant 1985 dollars by the year 2000.
These  results are shown in Table IX.  Under Scenario  II, Asian countries would face the highest rise
in grain import costs, followed by Middle Eastern  developing  countries.31
TABLE  VilI
SIMULATION  RESULTS




1992  -0.55  1.56
1995  -0.64  2.37
2000  -1.00  6.49
CORN
1992  -0.39  0.69
1995  -0.61  1.72
2000  -0.62  2.18
*  Percent changes relative to Base Simulation.
Source: IECIT, The World Bank.32
TABLE IX
CHANGES  IN DEVELOPING  COUNTRY  NET GRAIN  IMPORTS  COSTS
SCENARIO  I  SCENARIO  II
(Millions  of 1985 US $  )
ASIA
1995  -29  165
2000  -63  407
AFRICA
1995  - 5  19
2000  -12  81
LATIN  AMERICA
1995  -12  40
2000  -24  141
MIDDLE  EAST
1995  -26  93
2000  -54  277
ALL DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
1995  -72  317
2000  -153  906
}Changes Relative  to Base  Simulation
Source: IECIT,  The World Bank.33
VIl. Concludinc  Remarks
7.1  This paper presents  the domestic EC10  and world grain market impacts of policy reforms in
the  European Community.  The effects  on  EC prices, production, and net  trade of  eliminating
agricultural border taxes and subsidies (MCAs)  are estimated.  In addition, the reduction  of support
prices is simulated and the effects  on world grain prices and trade of  developing countries are
estimated.
7.2  Estimates  of the short-run  supply functions suggest  that area  and  yields in each  of the member
country are responsive  to prices and crop revenues. This provides  support for the view that EC  price
policies  have been  a source  of growth in output.  However, the supply responses  in most countries are
found to be inelastic in the short-run. Hence, reductions in price support will have limited effect on
production in the short-run.  However, the results also suggest the significant role of  technology
changes  as a source of growth in EC  grain yields.
7.3  The world price and trade effects of the stabilizers  and  the MCAs are shown to be small. This
is partly due to the inelastic supply response  and the offsetting effects of exchange  rate policies in
member countries.  This implies that  each member country's  macroeconomic  policies have also
affected the level of protection  in EC  agriculture. Analysis of effects of proposals  under consideration
in trade negotiations  to reduce protection in EC agriculture  should therefore consider  the effects of
macroeconomic  policies and exchange  rate variations on agricultural protection.
7.4  Under current EC  macroeconomic  policies,  large price reductions would be necessary  in order
to bring  production in line with demand. Since  such large  price cuts are currently politically infeasible,
policies designed  to remove  land and farmers from grain production are likely to be more important.
However, the land set-aside  schemes  will have to be implemented  with  much higher compensation
payments than now contemplated  before they will have a significant effect on production.
7.5  Elimination  of MCAs results in a slight decline in world wheat and coarse grain prices.  This
results in slightly lower total net grain import costs for the developing countries.  However, the
elimination of the CAP and a return to pre-CAP  growth paths for yields would result in a significant
decline in EC  production and net grain exports --- resulting in substantially higher world wheat and
coarse grains prices and significantly higher imprrt costs for developing  countries.34
References
Agra  Europe, Proceedings  of  the  Agrimoney Conference, Agra  Europe Special Report No.  33,
London, 1986.
Agra Europe,  "Green  Money, MCAs and the Green  ECU,"  Agra Europe  Special  Report  No. 47, London,
1988.
Agra Europe,  "1992:  Implications  for the Agrifood Industry," Agra Europe  Special  Report No. 48, 2nd
edition, London, July 1989.
Agra Europe,  Cap Monitor, various issues.
Australian Bureau of  Agricultural Economics, Aaricultural Policies in  the  European Community:
Their Oriains. Nature, and  Effects on Production  and  Trade, Policy  Monograph  No. 2 Canberra,
Australian Government  Publishing  Service.
Boyd, C. "The European  Monetary System and The New Arrangements  for MCA Dismantling," in
Proceedinas  of the Aarimonev Conference,  Agra Europe  Special Report No. 42, 1988.
Cecchini,  P., The European  Challenge  1992:  The Benefits  of a Single  Market, 1988.
Commission  of the European  Communities,  "Completing the Internal Market" White Paper  from the
Commission  to the European  Council COM (85) 310, Luxembourg.
Commission  of the European  Communities,  The Agricultural  Situation  in the Community,  various  issues,
Brussels,  Belgium.
Commiss:on of  the European Communities, Commission Proposals on the  Prices of  Agricultural
Products  and Related  Measures  1990/91, COM(11989),  Brussels,  January 5, 1989.
Eurostat, Agriculture, Prices, 1979-88.
Gardiner,  W.,  S. Neff, and D. Kelch, "EC 1992: Economic  Integration and World Trade Effects," in
World Agriculture: Situation and Outlook Report, USDA
June, 1990.
Henrichsmeyer,  W.,  "CAP Reform and 1992: A German Perspective,"  inEC  1992: Persoentives  in
Aariculture, Gardiner. W. and D. Kelch, editors, USDA Staff  Repu,  t No. AGES 9043,  May
1990.
Herlihy, M., S. Magiera, R. Henry, and K. Bailey, Aaricultural Statistics of the
European  Communitv, 1960-1985. USDA-ERS  Statistical Bulletin No. 770, January, 1989.
International  Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics. Vol. XLIII, July 1990.
Jostling, T. "Europe 1992: CAP Reform and World Agricultural Trade" in
EC  1  992:Perspectives  in Aariculture,  Gardiner  W. and D. Kelch,  editors, USDA  Staff Report  No.
AGES  9043, May 1990.35
Kelch, D. "Europe  1992: Implications  for Agriculture", in Western  Europe  Agriculture  and  Trade  ReDort,
USDA, ERS  RS-89-2, JIly  1989.
Kelch, D. and W.  Gardiner, "Europe 1992: Implications for  Food and Agriculture," National Food
Review. Vol. 12, October-December  1989.
Kelch, D. "Harmonization  of the Internal Market and Implications  for Intra- and Extra-EC  Agricultural
Trade," in EC  1992:PersDectives  in Aariculture, Gardiner,  W. and  D. Kelch,  editors, USDA  Staff
Report No. AGES  9043, May 1990.
Mackel, C. "The Effects on Community Agriculture  of the Green  Currency  System," in Proceedinas  of
the Agrimoney Conference,  Agra Europe  Special  Report No. 42, 1988.
Meilke, K.D. and tH. de Gorter, "Impacts of the Common Agricultural Policy on Intenational Wheat
Prices," Journal of Agricultural Economics, i 988, Vol. 39, 217-220.
OECD,  National Policies  and Agricultural Trade, Study on the European  Communities,  1987.
Ritson D., and S. Tangermann,  "The Economics  and Politics of Monetary Compensatory  An ounts,"
Eurooean  Review of Agricultural Economics,  6(2), 1979, pp. 119-164.
Sanderson,  B.A., J.J. Quilkey and J.W. Freebairn.  "Supply Response  of Australian Wheat Growers,"
Atustralian  Journal of Agricultural Economics,  1980, Vol. 24, 129-140.
Taylor, A., "The Impact on Trade of the Agrimonetary  System and the new MCA arrangements,"  in
Proceedings  of the Aarimoney Conference,  Agra Europe  Special  Report No. 42, 1988.Table  Al: Baseline  Projections  of  EC-10  Wheat  Production  By Country
Countries  Actual  Projections  :  Growth  Rates
1967-75  1975-81  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  2000  19678  1975-  1990-
1988  1988  2000
----------------- (-------------------------  '000  Tons)----------------------------------  ------------ (% p.a.)-
Belgium-Lux  857  891  1,263 1,171  1,199  1,189  1,206  1,225  1,243  1,261  1,382  1.78  2.52  1.50
Demnark  532  653  2,080 3,221  3,622  4,027  4,494  4,567  4,641  4,727  5,069  6.40  8.63  3.28
France  15,798  20,101  29,540  31,950 33,000  32,436 32,929  33,429  33,947  34,A63  37,509  2.89  2.79  1.52
Germany  6,380  7,598  11,922  11,032 11,300  11,209 11,388  11,576  11,749  11,943  13,150  2.88  3.27  1.65
Greece  1,819  2,467 2,300  1,984  1,400  1,875  1,j37  1,807  1,767  1,768  1,728  1.07  -0.50  1.93
IreLand  307  251  417  447  486  524  569  590  609  626  694  1.40  3.69  3.29
Italy  9,476  8,541 7,952 7,412  8,000  7,397  7,383  7,368  7,353  7,338  7,234  -0.80  -0.50  -0.20
Netherlards  686  794  827  1,047  1,075  965  985  1,004  '  U24  1,044  1,146  0.85  0.29  0.58
U. Kingdom  4,406  6,738  11,750  14,200 14,500  14,446 14,701  14,958  15,220  15,486  17,182  4.56  4.10  1.75
EC-10  40,261  48,034  68,051  72,464 74,582  74,070 75,492  76,524  77,553  78,656  85,094  2.41  2.52  1.40
Sources:  SPEL  Database,  University  of Bonn,  Germany  (Actual), World  Bank,  International  Economics  Department  (Projected).Tabte  Al:  Basetine  Projections  of EC-10  Coarse  Grains  Production  By Country
Countries  Actual  Projections  :  Growth  Rates
1967-75 1975-81  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  2000  19678  1975-  1989-
1988  1988  2000
---------------------------------------------- ('000  Tons)----------------------------------  --------  ---(%  p.a.)------
Belgium-Lux  985  957  1,008  872  807  880  883  891  902  920  970  0.11  0.37  0.89
Denmark  6,170  6,482 5,994 5,594  5,007  5,640  5,685  5,730  5,785  5,821  6,131  -0.13  0.56  0.77
France  20,139  22,309  26,340  25,012 23,561  25,199 2',388  25,578  25,767  25,960  27,263  1.23  1.19  0.72
Germany  13,362  14,481  15,191  15,080 14,550  15,103 15,124  15,143  15,166  15,187  15,351  0.59  0.34  0.15
Greece  1,374  1,776 2,504 2,242  ,,892  2,296  2,353  2,410  2,472  2,532  2,915  2.77  2.48  2.50
Ireland  1,096  1,598 1,719 1,761  1,726  1,765  1,768  1,772  1,775  1,779  1,806  2.07  0.52  0.21
Itaty  5,551  7,539 8,387 8,378  8,683  8,383  8,323  8,255  8,190  8,148  8,146  1.89  0.76  -0.23
Netherlands  m  451  390  315  270  312  311  308  306  303  282  -3.06  -1.03  -0.92
U. Kingdom  10,053  10,464 9,303 8,651  8,401  8,560  8,470  8,381  8,294  8,206  7,561  -0.35  -0.84  -1.05
EC-10  59,503  66,057  70,836  67,905 64,897  68,138 68,305  68,468  68,657  68,856  70,425  0.80  0.50  0.30 ____...__..________________._.____________._________________________________________________________________________________________
Sources:  SPEL  Database,  University  of Bonn,  Germany  (Actual); Wortd  Bank,  International  Fconomics  Department  (Projected).Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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